

XV. Macedonia: between two worlds (1945–1949)

by Ioannis Koliopoulos

*Professor of Modern History, Department of History and
Archaeology, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece*

The liberation of Macedonia, after the retreat of the Axis occupation forces, further complicated the already complex Macedonian Question; for apart from the friction associated with their old territorial claims, the three countries that had in 1913 shared the land of geographical Macedonia found themselves in 1945 in two politically and militarily opposing camps – and three years later in three. Greece, which had aligned itself with the Western Allies and was liberated with the help of British troops, found itself confronting Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, which had entered the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and with the help of Soviet troops had acquired communist regimes. Greece, after five years of civil conflict, whose final and harshest phase was played out in Greek Macedonia, had liberal constitutional and parliamentary institutions and had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Its membership of this alliance assured it the protection of the Western Great Powers, which took shape during the latter half of the 1940s, a testing time of severe distress and hardship in Greece.

During this period Macedonia occupied a key position not only between Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, but also between two different worlds that were engaged in a harsh ideological and political war, a confrontation that could have escalated into military conflict. Greek Macedonia was the Balkan frontier between the Western and the Eastern Worlds, the place where liberal democracy and communist totalitarianism, the free market economy and state socialism, met and locked horns. In the erstwhile Serbian Macedonia and later "People's Republic of Macedonia", a new nation and its accompanying state had been forged with the communist rhetoric of the day, while in Greek Macedonia the strength of the Greek nation-state was hard put to counter the threat represented by its northern neighbours and by those within its borders who repudiated liberal democracy and the free market economy.

The civil conflict in Greece and the establishment of communist regimes in the countries across its northern borders in the framework of the incipient Cold War determined the course of events in Macedonia. In the People's Republic of Macedonia the federal government made every effort to ensure that the new political entity would have a clear and indisputable pro-Yugoslavia orientation. Pro-Bulgarian elements in the state were isolated and politically destroyed, and pillars of Yugoslavianism installed in all key positions. Even in the question of language, every effort was made to keep Bulgarian and pro-Bulgarian scholars off the special committee that was set up to formulate the rules of grammar and syntax of the Slav-Macedonian language, so that the new national tongue would bear as little resemblance as possible to Bulgarian. The new nation of the *Makedonci* was incubated in the communist cradle of its new political entity, and nurtured with all possible assistance from the federal government of communist Yugoslavia.¹

In Greek Macedonia the national government had colossal problems to wrestle with. This province, and particularly its western part, was one of the regions of Europe most severely damaged by the ravages of World War II. Ruined villages, the life drained out of them by the war, stood like empty shells in a deserted landscape. The cities, too, had suffered heavy population losses. Thessaloniki lost an entire community: the city's Jewish population, numbering some 50,000 souls before the war, fell victim to

one of history's most abhorrent attempts to expunge one of Europe's oldest communities, a shining star in the firmament of its civilisation. Thessaloniki's ancient Jewish community never recovered its enviable position in the Macedonian capital after this blow.

The liberation of Greek Macedonia did not bring the desired security of life, honour and property guaranteed by a well-governed state that had been proclaimed by those who spoke in the name of the people and fought for its freedom. The period between the retreat of the German occupation forces in October 1944 and the spring of 1945, when the legitimate government authorities returned to the region, the interregnum during which EAM/ELAS held the reins, was a time of terrible distress and insecurity. What, in the meanwhile, were their allies and comrades-in-arms, the Slav-Macedonian separatists and their Yugoslav sponsors, doing, with their increasingly frequent, and increasingly provocative, appearances in the Slav-speaking villages of the region? The founding and maintenance of schools in Slav-speaking villages to teach the Slav-Macedonian language using the Cyrillic alphabet raised serious questions about the intentions of the Greek Communist Party cadres who permitted this activity. Even more serious questions were raised by the increasingly frequent appearances of armed Slav-Macedonian separatists in the mountain districts, particularly on the Vitsi and Kaimakchalan massifs. The KKE mouthpieces published assurances that these were resistance fighters who were being hounded by right-wing bands; but these failed to convince a large part of the rural population, who were in a position to see that the so-called resistance fighters were perpetrators rather than victims of violence and that they were openly acting as apostles and preachers of the Macedonianism of People's Republic of Macedonia. Nor were the first victims of these "persecuted" Slav-Macedonians among the representatives of the Greek government long in appearing.

The Greek authorities had similar questions about three more aspects of the intentions of the KKE and the communist regimes to the north: a) the disappearance of heavy ELAS arms after the Varkiza Treaty (12 February 1945) and the occasional discoveries by the authorities of caches of such arms, b) the systematic and mass flight of ELAS fighters, after Varkiza, to camps put at their disposal by the neighbouring communist countries, and particularly the Bulkes camp in the Yugoslav province of Vojvodina, and c) the increasing activity of armed bands in the mountains of Greek Macedonia, which KKE mouthpieces presented as persecuted resistance fighters engaged in self-defence².

The arms caches, the many ELAS guerrillas helped to escape to neighbouring communist countries and the armed bands of Leftists operating in the mountains of Greek Macedonia were linked to certain inescapable local realities of those first months after the defeat of ELAS in Athens and the Varkiza Treaty. One such reality was the appearance of armed bands of Rightists, who concentrated their attention on the villages of the region. Their targets and victims were former ELAS members and other Leftists, for they themselves were – or claimed to be – victims, or relatives of victims, of ELAS in the time of the Occupation and the EAM rule that followed it. These armed Rightists acted with the tacit approval of the government authorities and as their agents, sometimes constituting a surrogate authority, replacing the shadowy and impotent central administration.

The absence of any strong state authority in the region, and particularly in the countryside, favoured the action of such self-appointed upholders of justice; even in those areas where the central government was in a position to maintain strong forces, its manpower was drawn exclusively from the enemies of the Left, since Leftists were barred from government services, and first and foremost from the security police. The state authorities were forced by the new schism dividing the country to rely for the rule of

law and the maintenance of order on elements that undermined law and order and impeded the return of political normality, whose involuntary accomplices in this disabling of law and order and impediment to the return of political normality were the Leftist guerrillas supported by the KKE. The KKE, for its part, could not condemn the action of the Leftist guerrillas, for many of them had been its own wartime heroes. In short, the chaotic situation and the continuing political disorder, particularly in the countryside, were sustained by the short-term needs of both the government and the KKE. This was a dangerous political impasse, from which only a strong government could extract the country: by effectively suppressing all those who repudiated law and order and securely guarding the country's northern borders. But the government was weak, and although it had every reason to seek political normality after the collapse of the December Uprising, it was not helped by the KKE, staggering under recent military and political defeat and apparently without clear and convincing political objectives.

The Secretary-General of the KKE, Nikos Zachariadis, with the prestige and authority of the staunch and resolute communist leader who had served his time in the Dachau concentration camp, could perhaps have helped restore political order, if the KKE had been free of the attachments that had been created during the Occupation and if he himself had had clear political objectives. The KKE cadres who had run the party in his absence had bound it firmly to, primarily, the Yugoslav communists, and many of them were convinced that Greece too would follow its northern neighbours down the path they had chosen. A "Soviet" Greece in a "Soviet" Balkans under the protection of the Soviet Union was seen by many KKE cadres not as wishful thinking but as a feasible objective. As has already been said, this aspiration was encouraged by the Yugoslav communists in particular, for reasons that will become clear.

Without clear medium-term and long-term goals, the KKE seemed to be vacillating: its protestations in favour of political normality were undermined by the actions of many of those who acted as its members and spoke in its name. The Leftist heroes of the Occupation and later "avengers" who appeared as leaders of armed bands in Greek Macedonia, and their armed Slav-Macedonian comrades who used the soil of the People's Republic of Macedonia as a launching-pad for their incursions into Greece, had no thought of promoting political normality. A stronger KKE leadership, with clearly-defined political goals and independent of foreign influence, could perhaps have reined in the "heroes" and "avengers" of the Left, whose activity furnished the party's political opponents with all the arguments they needed to explain convincingly to Greek and foreign public opinion why the Government's repressive measures against the Leftists were not unjustified.

The vicious cycle of provocation and attack from both sides kept escalating the tensions and the scale of violence in the Greek countryside, especially in Macedonia. The mountain massifs on the border between Greece and the communist countries to the north – Grammos, Vitsi, Kaimakchalan and Rhodope – became Leftist guerrilla strongholds, initially impenetrable to the military forces available to the Greek Government. These strongholds of the Leftist repudiators of the legitimacy of the Greek state were the first to be created after the Liberation and the last to fall five years later.

The harsh guerrilla warfare conducted by the KKE against its political opponents, that is, against the old parties of the Centre and the Right, which has become known as the Greek Civil War, actually began in the autumn of 1943, when the KKE through ELAS attempted – with substantial success – to eliminate rival resistance organisations from the field, such as PAO in Macedonia. This enterprise took the form of a KKE bid to control the country from the time of the retreat of the German occupation forces until the defeat of ELAS in Athens and the Varkiza Treaty, then moderated until the autumn of 1946, only to take on greater dimensions and develop into a harsh ideological, politi-

cal and military confrontation that lasted until the summer of 1949 and the final defeat of the KKE. This ferocious civil conflict began when the KKE stepped into the national spotlight as a trustworthy and true-hearted patriotic political force, and ended with its political isolation and its patriotism disputed, with the further consequence that the Left in general was incapacitated as a political force for years to come and the Right correspondingly strengthened.

The civil war in Greece was linked to the then incipient Cold War, and was affected by it, but was not a consequence of it. Greek Macedonia found itself at the epicentre of that harsh conflict chiefly because Yugoslavia played such an active part in it, providing not only political support for the Macedonianism and irredentist designs of the People's Republic of Macedonia but also political support and military supplies for the KKE and its guerrilla army. First Yugoslavia's and then Bulgaria's involvement in Greece's civil war substantially affected both the form it took and the duration of its outcome.

The ideological-political and military conflict in Greek Macedonia had a serious impact on the face of the land, in that it was largely responsible for the polarisation of the refugees and the Slav-Macedonians and for the demographic decline of the latter. The refugees, who before World War II had largely supported the Venizelist Centre and the Left in general, now shifted to the Right. The Slav-Macedonians, on the other hand, shifted their allegiance to the Left during the civil war period, for two main reasons: a) because the communist guerrillas were using the Slav-Macedonian pockets in the border districts as their bases, and b) because of their proximity to the communist regime of the People's Republic of Macedonia.

These ideological-political shifts, which also included the collective shift of the bulk of the Vlach population to the Right, were coincidental and interlinked in the sense that they were to a considerable extent the result of the movement of the Slav-Macedonians towards Macedonianism and communism.

A more serious and more permanent consequence of the Civil War in the region was the demographic decline of the Slav-Macedonians. In the space of ten years, from the outbreak of World War II to the end of the Civil War, Greek Macedonia's traditional Slav-speaking pockets lost much of their population, and in some cases were even wholly deserted and abandoned. There was no basis to the accusations of the Yugoslav Government of the day that the Greek authorities pursued a systematic policy of ethnic cleansing, nor of course to later views supporting these charges. Both the charges of deliberate ethnic cleansing and the views they gave rise to were a means and a weapon in the then ideological struggle of the People's Republic of Macedonia and its successor to shape the ethnic identity and features of its people. The draining of the population from the Slav-speaking pockets of Greek Macedonia was one of the consequences of the long civil war in Greece. Greece's Slav-Macedonians were forced out of the country by the choices of their leaders, who throughout most of the Occupation identified with Bulgaria and then hastened to identify with the People's Republic of Macedonia to erase the memory of their pro-Bulgarianism.

The first mass exodus of Slav-Macedonians from Greek Macedonia to Yugoslavia took place right after the Liberation of Greece, in October 1944, when ELAS' two Slav-Macedonian divisions, on Vitsi and Kaimakchalan, disobeyed their orders to move farther into the interior and made for the People's Republic of Macedonia instead. They were followed by a stream of Slav-Macedonians over the next two years, as a result of the armed clashes between detachments of civil guards and Rightists on the one hand and Leftists on the other, and the flight of Slav-Macedonians accused of collaboration with the occupation authorities. A larger exodus of Slav-Macedonians took place during

the final phase of the Civil War, because the fighting during this period took place largely in the Slav-speaking pockets in Greek Macedonia. The Slav-Macedonians of Greece were, during this last and bloodiest phase of the civil war, the only reserves of the KKE guerrilla force, known as the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG), and thus bore the brunt of the losses in the fighting. Also, the overwhelming majority of the children abducted by order of the DAG in 1948 and sent to be raised in communist countries were Slav-Macedonians, as were the majority of the defeated DAG guerrillas who left Greece in the summer of 1949, after the defeat of the DAG in the Grammos-Vitsi massifs. The prevailing pro-Bulgarianism of the Slav-speaking areas of Greek Macedonia, which was transmuted during World War II into Macedonianism, sustained and deepened the hostility of a part of the Slav-Macedonians in Greece against the Greek state for half a century. This segment of the Slav-Macedonian population in Greece, which was never truly reconciled to the territorial situation created by the ten-year war in the Southern Balkans from 1912 to 1922, undermined the position of the entire community of Slav-Macedonians in the country, on the one hand by making its integration into Greek Macedonia more difficult, by promoting first Bulgaria and then the People's Republic of Macedonia as the real homeland of the Slav-Macedonians, and on the other by making it ethnically reprehensible in the eyes of those representatives of the Greek authorities who saw the refusal or reluctance of the Slav-Macedonians to integrate into Greece as a sure sign of a lack of loyalty to Greece. At that time – and this has to be remembered – the authorities of the nation-states in general were similarly uncomfortable with those whose actions or attitudes undermined their national homogeneity. Before the principle of respect for linguistic and religious heterogeneity had become generally accepted, assimilation of linguistic minorities was considered a desirable national goal and their complete integration an achievement of major significance. The homogeneous nation-state, indeed, was forged first in the West and later in the East, and especially in countries like Spain, England, France, Germany and the United States of America.

From the other side of the border, the communist architects of the new political entity and the nation it sheltered formed this new nation from the population surpluses of the already formed nations of the region and from elements of its history and culture, which they appropriated from their neighbours and adopted with the fanaticism of the convert. They also appropriated elements of the history and culture of the Bulgarians and the Serbs and the Greeks. This raid on the national histories of their neighbours was probably inescapable, as, similarly, was the search for glorious ancestors in the remote past, since the age of the origins of people is considered a determining element of its presence on the international scene and its pretensions. The new nation, the *Makedonci*, naturally did not break ground in any area of nation-making, but followed the paths and processes laid down by its neighbours.

Of even greater importance to the new nation, however, than a glorious past was its forthcoming – even more glorious – future. With the unwanted surpluses of neighbouring nations, the outcasts of their societies, the new nation in its splendid communist form would hasten unchecked towards prosperity and fame. The new nation and its political shape had a “mission”: to unite the fragmented land of Macedonia and to “liberate” the kindred parts of the nation still “occupied” by force by Greece and Bulgaria. The *Makedonci*, the new chosen people of the southern Balkan Peninsula, needed its own unredeemed brothers awaiting the hour of their redemption. This “mission” of redemption embraced by the new political entity and its people not unexpectedly concerned Greece more than Bulgaria, which was obliged to tolerate – until 1948 and the condemnation of the “revisionist” communist Yugoslavia by the newly set-up Comin-

form, which had replaced Comintern – the expansionist twaddle of the architects of the new political entity.

From Greece's viewpoint, this "mission" was not simply the annoyance of the pillaging of the history and civilisation of the ancient Macedonians, but a threat to its territorial integrity. The People's Republic of Macedonia was the spearhead of a powerful state, Yugoslavia, which supported the irredentist objectives of the new nation and its national home; indeed, both of them were of Yugoslav / communist conception. This threat to Greece became more perceptible when Tito's Yugoslavia and Dimitrov's Bulgaria appeared in 1947 at the Bled Conference to agree on the question of the future of Macedonia: their agreement brought back to Greek memories the equally threatening alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria in 1912, before the conclusion of the Greek-Bulgarian pact of the same year.³

The first glimmers of the danger represented by the Yugoslav and Bulgarian communists appeared in the autumn of 1944, directly after the withdrawal of the German armies from the southern Balkans in October of that year, when the Slav-Macedonians of the People's Republic of Macedonia tried to force the annexation of Bulgarian Macedonia to that new political entity; the Bulgaro-Macedonians resisted, however, and formed their own unit, the "Macedonian Brigade" of Pirin Macedonia (that is, Bulgarian Macedonia) to forestall the plans of the Slav-Macedonians.

The Communist Party of Bulgaria and the Patriotic Front, the communist-sponsored liberation movement that seized power in Bulgaria in September 1944, were concerned about the acts and intentions of the Slav-Macedonians of the People's Republic of Macedonia, for obvious reasons. Since Tito himself appears not to have approved such hasty action, which could damage the relations and prospects of cooperation between the two communist parties, a fragile compromise was reached. The Bulgarian communists undertook to grant administrative autonomy to Pirin Macedonia, while the Slav-Macedonians promised not to force the union of Pirin Macedonia with the People's Republic of Macedonia. Bulgarian Macedonia, naturally, did not acquire this promised autonomy, which would have facilitated its loss and its annexation by the People's Republic of Macedonia.

An attempt was made to overcome the obvious difficulty of this annexation of Bulgarian Macedonia to Yugoslav Macedonia through the creation of a Bulgaro-Yugoslav federation; but this solution was not successful either, since the result would have been very lop-sided, virtually amounting to outright annexation of Bulgaria. Yugoslavia wanted to include Bulgaria as one of its constituent republics, while Bulgaria proposed a new two-part federation of equal partners, which would have preserved Bulgaria's independence and prevented it being swallowed up by a Yugoslavia that was stronger in every way. Stalin tried to mediate to bring the two sides closer together, but the talks proved fruitless. No more successful in the end were the parallel attempts to sign a treaty of alliance between the two countries, which would have facilitated their eventual confederation.

These talks were followed by the Bulgaro-Yugoslav summit conference at Bled, in August 1947, which endeavoured to resolve the question of relations between the parts of Macedonia and the two countries. The Yugoslavs demanded that the Bulgaro-Macedonians of Pirin be given the right of self-determination, and thus essentially that this Bulgarian province be given the right to join the People's Republic of Macedonia; the Bulgarians counter-proposed the formation of a Bulgaro-Yugoslav federation. The conference resolved to go ahead with the formation of the federation and the granting of cultural autonomy to the Bulgaro-Macedonians, and to follow it in November of that same year with a pact of friendship between the two countries.

Following the Bled Agreement, the Slav-Macedonians of the People's Republic of Macedonia began to engage in intense cultural and propaganda activity in Bulgarian Macedonia, provoking serious displeasure among the Bulgarians. This displeasure manifested itself most sharply after the breach between Cominform and Yugoslavia in 1948. The Bulgarian Communists, among others, accused their Yugoslav comrades of trying to annex Bulgarian Macedonia to the People's Republic of Macedonia before the federation undertaken by the Bled Agreement could be founded. Yugoslavia's expulsion from Cominform in June 1948 and the open denunciation of the Bled Agreement by the Bulgarian Communists, who hastened to declare that "the founding of a federation of the South Slavs and the final union of the region of Pirin with the People's Republic of Macedonia are only feasible in terms of a Yugoslavia faithful to the common socialist and democratic international front", also tolled the knell for the peculiar state-within-a-state of the Slav-Macedonians of the People's Republic of Macedonia in Bulgarian Macedonia and put an end to all discussion on Bulgaria's part of the subject of the "union" of Macedonia.⁴

Yugoslavia's breach with Cominform was greeted with relief by Greece, since it staved off the creation of a federation of South Slavs and prevented the annexation of Bulgarian Macedonia to the People's Republic of Macedonia. It did not, of course, put an end to the Yugoslav communist propaganda announcing the imminent "liberation" of "Aegean Macedonia" and its union with the metropolis of the "New Macedonia", the People's Republic of Macedonia, but this was no longer anything but bluster from a regime henceforth isolated from the temple of existing socialism, the Soviet Union, and under siege.

This threat to Greek Macedonia did not vanish, of course, but it did become less serious. The Slav-Macedonian nation and its instituted political entity had been a very real and serious threat from 1944 until 1948, from the establishment of the People's Republic of Macedonia to the breach between Yugoslavia and Cominform, when there was still a possibility that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria might unite in a federation of South Slavs and annex Bulgarian Macedonia to the People's Republic of Macedonia.

The breach between Yugoslavia and Cominform drastically reduced the threat to Greek Macedonia from another quarter, since it dealt a further blow to the KKE guerrilla army in Greece. It is not true, as the Greek communist leadership claimed, that the breach between Yugoslavia and Cominform and the concomitant breach between the KKE and the communist regime in Yugoslavia was the principal cause of the defeat of the Greek guerrillas in 1949: the KKE's break with Tito merely hastened that defeat. The KKE's guerrilla army, and the party itself, having first been defeated morally and politically, became increasingly isolated and in the summer of 1948 were led to an impasse from which there was no escape. Furthermore, the breach between the two communist parties did not harden the Yugoslav attitude towards the Greek guerrillas, the majority of whom from 1948 on were Slav-Macedonians from Greece.

The last act of the drama of the Greek Civil War was played out in Greek Macedonia and for the future of a portion of it. When the KKE guerrillas were forced in 1948 to limit their activities to Northern Greece, the party leadership focused on seizing and holding at least one city in the region, to serve as the seat of the Provisional Government it had formed with Markos Vafiadis as its Premier in December 1948. The goal of taking a city in the region, which had been adopted a year earlier, became an objective in 1948, when the communist guerrillas restricted their action essentially to Northern Greece. Kastoria, Florina and Edessa, strongly defended by the national army, were all targeted by the communist guerrillas; and it was in these cities that the aggres-

sive force of the guerrillas and the defensive strength of the army were most severely tested.

In this final act of the drama in Greek Macedonia the actors were joined on stage by a chorus of boys and girls in one of the saddest episodes of the Civil War, the *Paidomazoma*. Children of all ages, from toddlers to teenagers, were abducted and carried over the border by the KKE guerrillas: to save them from the hardships of war, according to the KKE; to serve as future guerrilla reserves, according to the Greek Government. Meanwhile, other children were removed from the war zone by the Greek authorities under the sponsorship of Queen Frederika and housed in special children's villages in the interior of the country, where orphans and those without guardians could be cared for, away from the hardships of war.⁵

The abduction of nearly 30,000 children from Greece, particularly from Greek Macedonia, for philanthropic and other unspoken but easily perceived reasons on the one hand further hardened the ideological-political war between the two opposing sides and on the other reinforced the inescapable thinning of Greece's Slav-Macedonian population. The transportation outside Greece and the Macedonisation of many thousands of Slav-Macedonian children dealt a serious blow to the demographic structure of the country's Slav-Macedonian population, and strengthened the irredentism of the new nation of *Makedonci* and their nation-state. The abducted Slav-Macedonian children, as will be shown in the relevant chapter, became – wherever they were tossed by the torrents of war – fanatical preachers of Macedonianism. Whether in the People's Republic of Macedonia or in the Diaspora, in the New World and in Oceania, the transported Slav-Macedonian children of 1948 have been one of the hardest cores of irredentist Macedonianism, emotionally easy prey for the leadership of the People's Republic of Macedonia and the apostles of Macedonianism. Greece, which was prevented from keeping and preserving those children in 1948, was projected as the heartless step-mother whose children later repudiated her.

The final act of folly on the part of the KKE leadership, before the military defeat of the guerrillas and their retreat from the mountain massifs of Grammos and Vitsi into – mainly – Albania, was related to the Macedonian Question. In order to satisfy the Slav-Macedonian guerrillas of the Democratic Army of Greece, the party's Central Committee adopted the proposition of its Secretary-General Nikos Zachariadis to include as one of the basic goals of the KKE the promise that the Slav-Macedonians of Greece should be guaranteed the right of self-determination – after the expected “victorious” end to the war then raging in northern Greek Macedonia. This was yet another *coup de main* on the part of the Secretary-General, who never ceased, right up to the final defeat of the communist guerrillas or afterwards, to surprise even his coterie of sycophants with this sort of timeserving tergiversation designed to keep him on the right – that is, the Soviet – side in the furious struggle that was shaking the communist camp. It was the last desperate decision of Greece's communist leaders on Greek soil before they retreated behind the curtain of existing socialism.

Notes

1. Cf. Spyridon Sfetas, *I diamorfosi tis slavomakedonikis taftotitos*, [*The formation of Slav-Macedonian identity*], Thessaloniki 2003. See also Barker, *Macedonia*, p. 163 ff.

2. Ioannis S. Koliopoulos, *Leilasia phronimaton* [*Plundered loyalties*], vol. II, Thessaloniki 1995, p. 67 ff.
3. Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 172 ff.
4. *Idem*, p. 174.
5. Koliopoulos, *Plundered loyalties*, vol. II, p. 213 ff.